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THE PARKING LOT CASES REVISITED:
CONFUSION AT OR ABOUT THE GATE
William V. Vetter*
When entering a parking lot, have you ever had a stray
thought about who will absorb the loss if your vehicle or its
contents are stolen or damaged while you are off doing im-
portant things? Probably not. Or, if you did, the stray
thought was casually dismissed as something not worth wor-
rying about. Some courts believe that the average motorist
understands the various legal relationships among which the
lot operator and motorist might jointly choose.' That belief is
unrealistic. As shown in the following discussion, many
courts do not have a detailed understanding of parking lot-
related issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Research databases reveal a dearth of articles specifi-
cally dealing with issues of parking lot operators' liability to
their patrons, and none of the articles found on this subject
are recent.2 Perhaps this results from apathy. After all, the
* Assistant Professor of Law and Tax, Indiana University-Purdue Univer-
sity Fort Wayne; Fulbright Scholar Lecturer, 1999-2000, Adilet Higher School
of Law, Almety, Kazakhstan. LL.M., George Washington University; J.D., Uni-
versity of Oregon.
1. In Burcham v. Coney Island, Inc., 94 N.E.2d 280 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949),
the court stated, without equivocation:
When the owner of a motor vehicle drives it into a parking lot, he [or
she] must be aware that more than one relationship between the op-
erator and himself [or herself) may be created. The owner may be
merely interested in securing a place to leave his vehicle, or he may
also wish to secure its safety. It is only reasonable to require the
owner of the vehicle to use reasonable measures to insure the accep-
tance of responsibility by the operator of the parking lot if the added
burden of bailment is desired by the owner.
Id. at 282. Perhaps the court's statement was accurate in 1949; one doubts its
accuracy in 1999.
2. Variously worded searches of the "Westlaw" database reveal no articles.
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only parties concerned with parking lot liability are the com-
panies that insure parking lot operators. Not really-lot op-
erators are frequently held not liable for the losses. In addi-
tion, most insurance policies have many deductions and
exclusions which may result in the vehicle3 owner4 or the lot
operator absorbing the losses. Lack of coverage is most likely
when the vehicle itself is not stolen, but is damaged or its
contents are removed. Another possible explanation for the
dearth of articles on this subject is that the subject seems so
mundane and lacking in glamour. Although that may be
true, the rules concerning parking lots potentially impact
millions of persons every day, and are of immediate concern
to the thousands of persons who have their vehicles stolen
from a parking lot every day.
Everyone is aware of the dependence on personal motor
vehicles in the United States. In many areas, private vehi-
cles are the only mode of transportation. That is true even in
parts of larger urban areas (which have no excuse for poor
public transportation). Naturally, when a vehicle is driven
somewhere, it must be temporarily abandoned (a.k.a. parked)
while the driver does whatever it is that prompted the excur-
sion. Every driver knows that finding an acceptable place to
park her or his vehicle can be a significant problem. To sat-
isfy this need for parking, many suburban malls devote more
Other sources produce two: John R. Feather, Recent Decisions, Bailment-Arti-
cles Left in Automobiles, 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 216 (1958) (focusing on one D.C.
case, but citing others), and Laurence M. Jones, The Parking Lot Cases, 27
GEO. L.J. 162 (1938). Professor Jones was able to divide the pre-1938 cases into
two categories based primarily on the degree of security provided by the lot.
The article concludes that without security or control, the lots were held licen-
sors; with security, the lots were generally held bailees. The situation has
changed since 1938, particularly in the variety of parking lots.
3. The term "vehicle" is used in lieu of colloquialisms or the perhaps more
accurate "personal motor vehicle." As used in this article, it is intended to in-
clude all types of transportation modes that may be temporarily stored in a
parking lot, including but not limited to, motorcycles, cars, automobiles, trucks,
pickups, sport utility vehicles, vans, etc. It specifically does not include air-
craft, watercraft, or non-motorized items.
4. Throughout this discussion the term "vehicle owner" or "owner" is used
to identify the person who drives a vehicle to, and leaves it at, a parking lot.
However, the rules discussed do not depend on title to the vehicle. Vis-d-vis the
lot operator, the person driving the vehicle has the same rights, regardless of
the driver's rights to title or possession of the vehicle. Of course if some other
person, or the police, can demonstrate a better right to the vehicle (e.g., it had
been previously stolen), the lot operator would be obliged to recognize those
rights.
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land to parking than to retailing, urban buildings incorporate
multiple sub-basements devoted to parking, and transporta-
tion hubs incorporate huge parking facilities.
The characteristics of parking lots vary significantly,
from open, unmarked, unpaved lots to multi-story, enclosed,
and closely monitored structures designed exclusively for
parking. Operational aspects also vary significantly. Many
lots are not regularly attended, with attendants making only
infrequent visits to collect deposited fees and make sure
there are no non-paying parkers. At the other end of the con-
tinuum are valet parking lots where the owner surrenders
the vehicle and its keys to an attendant who parks and re-
trieves the vehicle. Probably the most popular parking lots
(in terms of numbers of parking spaces provided) are multi-
story, dedicated parking structures that have automated en-
try gates and attended exit gates, where the vehicle owner
chooses the parking place and retains the keys (hereafter re-
ferred to as "park-and-lock structures"). Park-and-lock struc-
tures are invariably found at airports and in central business
districts and are frequently found in other places, such as
shopping malls and sports stadiums. Interestingly, park-
and-lock structures came into general use after the previ-
ously mentioned law review articles on parking lots were
published. Park-and-lock structures have created significant
problems for the courts, resulting in the law becoming less
uniform. The law has also become more fact-oriented, re-
quiring considerable inquiry into the specifics of each case.
This lack of uniformity in the law provides a good reason for
revisiting this issue.
This article discusses the development of the law relat-
ing to the liability of parking lot operators for loss of, or dam-
age to, patrons' vehicles and the contents of those vehicles.5
5. This article does not discuss the disclaimers or other attempts to limit
liability that are routinely printed on parking tickets or posted at parking lots.
The primary reason is that such disclaimers are routinely held ineffectual. See,
e.g., Allright, Inc. v. Schroeder, 551 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, writ refd
n.r.e); Allright, Inc. v. Elledge, 508 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974, no writ).
Even when bailment rules are abandoned, little direct effect is given to dis-
claimer clauses. See Ellish v. Airport Parking Co. of Am., Inc., 345 N.Y.S.2d
650 (App. Div. 1973), discussed infra, notes 57-69. However, in White v. At-
lanta Parking Serv. Co., 228 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976), a disclaimer clause
in a monthly contract with a downtown parking garage was interpreted as part
of the description of the item(s) bailed under the contract, i.e., as the bailee's
express refusal to accept bailment/possession of the vehicle's contents.
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Part II discusses liability with respect to vehicles themselves.
Part III addresses liability with respect to vehicles' contents.
To the extent this article reaches a conclusion or recommen-
dation, it is that reversion to the ancient law of bailment, or
something akin thereto (with a more liberal interpretation of
"control") is the most desirable course for the future.
II. PARKING LOT CASES: LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE OR
Loss OF VEHICLES
A. Bailment
1. Background
The legal rules traditionally applied to motor vehicles in
parking lots have existed much longer than motor vehicles
themselves. The most ancient legal predecessors are prop-
erty law rules concerning possessory interests.6 Over the
centuries these rules became commingled with contract law
and, more recently, tort (negligence) law. Therefore, the cur-
rent bailment rules are a combination of contract and tort
rules, but with a foundation in property law that is often
overlooked.
Mr. Justice Joseph Story, in his seminal Commentaries
on the Law of Bailments, contributed to or established the
strong contract leanings of modern bailment law in the
United States. Justice Story defined "bailment" as "a deliv-
ery of a thing in trust for some special object or purpose, and
upon a contract, express or implied, to conform to the object
or purpose of the trust."7 Story went to considerable length
to demonstrate how every bailment, "gratuitous" or compen-
sated, includes sufficient consideration to support a cause of
action for breach of contract.8 Story used a very flexible defi-
nition of "consideration," concluding that a bailor gives con-
sideration merely by transferring possession in exchange for
the bailee's promise (which is the bailee's consideration) to
satisfy the bailor's purpose. The bailor's consideration does
not exist, however, until possession is actually transferred.
6. See HUGH E. WILLIS, CASES ON BAILMENTS AND PUBLIC CALLINGS 1-6
(1923).
7. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 2 (Edmond
H. Bennett, ed., 8th ed. 1870) (photo. reprint 1986) (1832).
8. See id. at 4 n.4. The footnote exceeds three pages of fine type.
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Therefore, an agreement to deliver into bailment in the fu-
ture is not an enforceable agreement.' Thinking of bailment
as just a species of contract law can be misleading because of
the absolute liability for breach of contract. That is, if the
bailee fails to properly redeliver the item, a breach of a con-
tract, and absolute liability, would result. However, a bailee
is protected from liability if the failure was not due to its
negligence, even if the failure may not satisfy the contract
law excuse of impossibility. Story admits that the bailor can
elect a cause of action for negligence, misfeasance, or tort in
addition to breach of contract.".
The very early common law on bailments held the bailee
absolutely liable, in a cause of action for debt, for failure to
return an item." It was not until the thirteenth century that
courts excused failure to redeliver when "accident, fire, wa-
ter, or larceny," not caused by the bailor, made redelivery
impossible."
Bailment rules, as applied, seem more consistent with
property, agency, or trust law than with contract law. Jus-
tice Story's treatise takes pains to demonstrate that in most
bailments, the bailee does not have a property right in the
item."' However, Story uses the term "property" to represent
the amount of legal title required to support a cause of action
in trover.4 He acknowledges that every bailee has a cause of
action in trespass against third parties who interfere with his
possession of the bailed item. 5 Since the technical niceties of
common law pleading are no longer important, nor even gen-
erally known, applying Story's discussion to modern settings
may result in more confusion than enlightenment.
If one person suffers injury to person or property while
on another's land, the initial question is the relationship be-
tween the two persons. When personalty of one person that
is present (with consent) on another's realty is damaged or
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 1-2 (quoting 2 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF
LEGAL LIABILITY 252-57 (1906)).
12. Id.
13. See STORY, supra note 7, §§ 93-93i, 150, 279. However, in the special
case of pawn, the pawnee does have a "special property" in the bailed item. Id.
§ 352.
14. See id. §§ 93-95.
15. See id. § 93c.
1999]
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disappears, the available legal relationships are lease, li-
cense, or bailment. 16  Traditionally, these three possibilities
apply to a motor vehicle temporarily on another's realty, such
as in a parking lot. 7 In parking lot cases, many courts make
virtually no distinction between lease and license, presenting
parking lot problems as a choice between lease/license and
bailment. 8
To decide the "license versus bailment" issue, the initial
question is whether the parties created a bailment. The ele-
ments of a bailment are the same for automobiles and their
content as for any other forms of property. A bailment exists
when: (1) possession of an item of personal property (2) is
transferred by its rightful possessor to another person (3)
with the transferee's agreement (a) to accept the item and (b)
to return it to the original possessor or otherwise deliver the
item as the transferor directs. 9
16. See, e.g., Dunegan v. Apico Inns of Green Tree, Inc., 514 A.2d 912 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986). This assumes that the owner of the damaged property has no
estate or tenancy rights in the underlying realty. Traditional common law
property rules make significant distinctions between a landowner's duty to in-
vitees, licensees, and trespassers. The more recent trend is to downplay those
distinctions and instead apply a "reasonable under the circumstances" rule.
17. See, e.g., Caltafano v. Higgins, 191 A.2d 330 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pappagallo Restaurant Inc., 547 So. 2d 243 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1989). Nearly every decision cited in this article could be cited as di-
rect or indirect support for this statement. The use of traditional bailment
rules as the starting point for analysis is pervasive, even by courts that have
held that bailment rules should not be used.
18. Bailment problems relating to parked motor vehicles sometimes carry a
hint of the special-case bailment rules applied to innkeepers. Traditional com-
mon law rules make innkeepers virtual guarantors of property entrusted to
their care. An innkeeper bailment is created in the same manner as any other.
However, the innkeeper's defenses in the event of non-redelivery are severely
limited. The earliest cases dealing with vehicle bailments relied on earlier
cases dealing with horses and carriages that were bailed at inns or livery sta-
bles. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Depoyster, 272 S.W. 398 (Ky. 1925). Cases involv-
ing bailment to an innkeeper are relevant when the issue relates to the creation
of a bailment, but may be distinguishable when the issue relates to the bailee's
defenses.
19. See, e.g., Malone v. Santora, 64 A.2d 51 (Conn. 1949); Seedman v. Jaffer,
132 A. 414 (Conn. 1926); Wall v. Airport Parking Co., 244 N.E.2d 190 (Ill. 1969);
Sewell v. Fitz-Inn Auto Parks, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 853 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975); Col-
well v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, Inc., 386 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986); Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Moore, 560 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1997,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). The decisions cited in this discussion uniformly define bail-
ment as requiring an express or implied contract, probably because all of them
do involve situations in which contracts were created. However, gratuitous
bailment is legally possible, so long as there is an agreement concerning the
transfer of possession and redelivery. See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 1 (1997).
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When a vehicle containing personal property is left in a
parking lot, courts have generally engaged in two separate
analyses in determining liability, one concerning the vehicle,
and one concerning the vehicle's contents. A conclusion that
the automobile was not bailed apparently moots any question
concerning bailment of its content." The key (pun intended)
to bailment of a vehicle is control, normally both accom-
plished and symbolized by transfer of keys from the owner
(bailor) to the lot operator (bailee).2"
2. Keys Surrendered
When an owner leaves a vehicle and its keys with a lot
operator, there is a bailment, at least of the vehicle.22 For ex-
ample, in Insurance Co. of North America v. Solari Parking,
Inc. ,23 the Langes were on their honeymoon and moving
across the country at the same time. Reaching the French
Quarter in New Orleans, they searched until they found an
attended, enclosed parking lot because they were apprehen-
sive about leaving their car, which was filled with their pos-
sessions, on a city street. After a short discussion with the
lot attendant, the Langes left their car and its keys. The lot
attendant entered and started the vehicle, intending to move
it, but was called away to wait on another customer. The at-
tendant left the engine running. While the attendant was
20. See, e.g., Weinberg v. Wayco Petroleum Co., 402 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App.
1966); Giles v. Meyers, 107 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio C.P. 1952).
21. The keys transferred must be those necessary to actually operate the
automobile. If it is possible to start the engine without the keys, possession can
be transferred by informing the bailee of that fact. See Dispeker v. New S. Ho-
tel Co., 373 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1963). The ability to unlock the door, but not to
activate the ignition, would not be sufficient, nor would having the ignition key
but not the key to locked doors. However, possession of the automobile can be
transferred without providing access to its trunk. Modern automobiles have
any number of combinations of keys and access options. For some, one key fits
all. Others have a separate key for the trunk and no other access method.
Others have a separate trunk key, but also have a button or lever inside the
passenger compartment to open the trunk. Some with an interior trunk release
allow "locking out" that release, which interestingly enough is sometimes called
a "valet lock." Separate access to the vehicle's trunk may be significant in con-
tent cases.
22. This is invariably the result in "valet parking" situations where the ve-
hicle owner's obvious, and perhaps paramount, intent is to have the attendant
take exclusive possession of the vehicle and its keys, drive to an attendant-
determined space, and retrieve it when the owner decides to leave.
23. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Solari Parking, Inc., 370 So. 2d 503 (La.
1979).
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away, the vehicle was stolen. The Langes recovered for their
vehicle, based on bailment. The court found that giving the
vehicle's keys to the lot attendant while the vehicle was in a
position that requires it to be moved by the attendant obvi-
ously transferred physical control to the attendant.2 4 Courts
routinely find a bailment whenever a vehicle's keys are left
with the lot operator. 5
3. Keys Not Surrendered
When the owner drives into an open-air parking lot, with
or without obtaining a parking ticket, locks the vehicle, and
takes the keys, most courts find no bailment. The majority of
decisions finding no bailment stress the bailee's inability to
physically and independently control the vehicle.
Some of the easier no-bailment cases relate to parking
lots near sports stadiums. For example, in Travelers Insur-
ance Co. v. Pond,26 the vehicle owner drove into a parking lot
near Crosley Field in Cincinnati, paid an attendant the one-
dollar parking fee, received a "claim check," parked, rolled up
the windows, locked the doors, kept the keys, and went to the
baseball game. When he returned, the vehicle was gone.
There was no evidence that the ticket was anything other
than a receipt for payment. The lot was not fenced, had mul-
tiple exits, and there was no need to show the ticket to leave.
The court stressed the difference between sports stadium lots
and downtown business lots. 27 The essence was that no one
wants to hang around the parking lot after the game, waiting
in line as vehicles are individually and leisurely checked out.
The pivotal factor for the court was, however, that nothing
indicated, symbolically or otherwise, a transfer of control to
24. See id. at 506-07. The primary contest in Solari concerned the vehicle's
contents, not the vehicle itself.
25. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pappagallo Restaurant Inc., 547 So.
2d 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Davidson v. Ramsby, 210 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1974); System Auto Parks & Garages, Inc., v. American Econ. Ins. Co., 411
N.E.2d 163 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Garlock v. Multiple Parking Servs. Inc., 427
N.Y.S.2d 670 (Buffalo City Ct. 1980); Stephens v. Katz Parking Sys., Inc., 348
N.Y.S.2d 492 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973); Dispeker v. New S. Hotel Co., 373
S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1963) (gave keys to hotel doorman); Allright, Inc. v. Schroe-
der, 551 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, writ refd n.r.e); Allright, Inc. v. El-
ledge, 508 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974, no writ).
26. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pond, 143 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
27. See id. at 191 (quoting 24 AM. JUR. 493 (Cum. Supp. 1956)).
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the parking lot operator. 8 Other cases presenting similar
parking lot arrangements in venues other than sports stadi-
ums reach similar results under the same rationale. 9 Park-
and-lock lots that are unattended and not enclosed give even
less basis for concluding a bailment was created.
However, not all "park-and-lock" cases conclude that no
bailment is created. Cases involving modem, semi-
automated parking structures have produced conflicting
resolutions of the principal issue, i.e., control. Does a lot op-
erator obtain control (i.e., "possession") sufficient to support a
bailment when it does not have the means of starting and
moving the vehicle? °
The common parking structure scenario is as follows.
The structure is expressly designed for parking vehicles that
are driven to and from a parking space by the vehicle opera-
tor. Usually, the structure is a separate building, or a sepa-
rate, distinct part of a larger building. To obtain access, a
driver must retrieve a time-stamped ticket from an auto-
mated dispenser. The driver then chooses a parking place
without direction or assistance from lot attendants, parks
and locks the vehicle, and retains the keys. Egress from the
structure is also limited. To exit, all vehicles must pass by
attended fee-collection booths, with the exit physically
blocked by a mechanism controlled by the attendant. Before
leaving the structure, the driver must present an entry ticket
to the attendant. Based on the entry time stamped on the
ticket, the attendant calculates the fee. Until the fee is paid,
exit is physically barred. In the typical situation, the driver
contacts a lot attendant only when attempting to leave the
28. See id. See also Giles v. Meyers, 107 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio C.P. 1952) (dif-
ferent ballpark, same situation, same result).
29. See, e.g., Allright Phoenix Parking, Inc. v. Shabala, 429 P.2d 513 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1967) (lot near movie theater); Osborn v. Cline, 189 N.E. 483 (N.Y.
1934) (open lot part of gas station, no exit control); Rhodes v. Pioneer Parking
Lot, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1973) (pre-pay park-and-lock, no attendant).
In Rokosa v. Hartford Jai Alai, Inc., 430 A.2d 1318 (Conn. App. Ct. 1981),
the vehicle owner had a choice of options: "VALET PARK $2," "SELF-PARK
$1," and "FREE PARKING AT YOUR OWN RISK." The plaintiff chose "self-
park", paid the dollar fee, parked and locked his car, and retained the key. The
court held there was no bailment because the plaintiff retained control of the
vehicle. There was no discussion of the significance of the lot operator's distinc-
tion between self-park (for a consideration) and free parking.
30. If the lot operator uses a tow truck to take the vehicle to another loca-
tion, most courts would find that the operator had taken control, even without
the keys. But that usually happens without the owner's consent.
1999]
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lot-or after discovering his or her vehicle missing or dam-
aged. This type of lot is predominant in areas of high de-
mand and high land values, such as city business districts
and airports. Often they are the only place one can park,
particularly at busy airports.
In Sparrow v. Airport Parking Co. of America,"' a Penn-
sylvania Superior Court hearing an appeal from the Court of
Common Pleas dealt with a typical midtown parking struc-
ture. The plaintiff obtained a time-stamped ticket from the
entry vending machine, the barrier raised to admit him, he
parked where he chose, locked his car, and kept the keys, all
without encountering an attendant. When he returned, his
car was missing. The plaintiff contended that a bailment was
created because exit from the structure was restricted. The
lot arrangement required a person wishing to drive any vehi-
cle out of the structure to present an entry ticket and pay a
fee. Thus, the owner contended, the lot operator, not the ve-
hicle driver/owner, effectively controlled the vehicle's move-
ment.32 Relying principally on a Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision," the court found that, factually, the auto-
mated parking structure is more like an unattended lot than
it is like an attended lot where the attendant takes the keys,
parks the car, and gives the keys back when the owner re-
turns to leave with his or her car.3" The court found that the
claim check, rather than being symbolic of the lot operator's
control, was merely a means of determining the parking fee,
primarily because there was no way to connect a particular
vehicle to a particular ticket.35 Thus, the court held, a key
element of bailment, possession by the bailee, was absent.
Instead, the court held that the park-and-lock patron merely
contracts for a limited license to use the space and granted no
31. Sparrow v. Airport Parking Co. of Am., 289 A.2d 87 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1972).
32. See id. at 89.
33. See Taylor v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 156 A.2d 525 (Pa. 1959).
34. See Sparrow, 289 A.2d 87 at 90.
35. See id. at 90-91.
36. See id. See also Wall v. Airport Parking Co., 244 N.E.2d 190 (Ill. 1969)
(airport park-and-lock); Coleman v. Chicago Thoroughbred Enter., Inc., 243
N.E.2d 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (non-airport park-and-lock); Rhodes v. Pioneer
Parking Lot, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1973) (non-airport park-and-lock); All-
right Auto Parks, Inc. v. Moore, 560 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1997, writ refd
n.r.e.) (same, citing cases with similar results).
[Vol. 40
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relief to the plaintiff.37
Not all courts agree. For example, Massachusetts courts
have consistently held that operators of park-and-lock struc-
tures are bailees of their patron's cars.38 Thus, there is no
consensus on the "bailment versus license" question for park-
and-lock structures.
How to characterize the bailee's control is not obvious in
the park-and-lock structure situations. On one hand, the ve-
hicle owner retains the ability to move the vehicle (under its
own power) by retaining the vehicle's keys. On the other
hand, the vehicle's movement is severely restricted because
the lot operator bars the vehicle's exit until the owner pays
the required fees. Further, the lot operator's ability to pre-
vent the vehicle's egress clearly restricts the vehicle owner's
freedom to drive wherever she wishes-hence, the owner
does not have unrestricted control. Perhaps because of these
difficulties, some courts employ alternate analyses.
37. The court's final conclusion was that the pleadings and affidavits raised
a factual issue concerning the existence and scope of an alleged implied con-
tract to protect the vehicle and the matter was sent back to the Court of Com-
mon Pleas. See Sparrow, 289 A.2d at 93.
38. See, e.g., Richard v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 310 N.E.2d 146 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1974); American Auto Sales, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 308
N.E.2d 781 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974); Hale v. Massachusetts Parking Auth., 265
N.E.2d 494 (Mass. 1970); Greenberg v. Shoppers' Garage Inc., 105 N.E.2d 839
(Mass. 1952). In these cases, the lot operator's apparent lack of concern may
have influenced the results. In American Auto Sales, the court stated:
It was within the trial judge's discretion to admit testimony by a police
officer assigned to the airport as to the number of automobiles stolen
from the defendant's garage during the month of the theft and during
prior months. It was relevant to show that the condition in which the
garage was operated permitted thefts in substantial numbers, and
there was no indication that this condition had changed.
American Auto Sales, 308 N.E.2d at 782. In New York, however, apparently
the same considerations prompted the Appellate Division to decide that the lot
operator's duty was limited because the lot patron could see there was little
protection. See Ellish v. Airport Parking Co. of Am., Inc., 345 N.Y.S.2d 650
(App. Div. 1973), discussed infra notes 57-66.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court held that airport parking structures are
distinguishable from a park-and-lock lot that was fenced but had no limitation
on exit because the vehicle operator paid in full, in advance. See Sewell v. Fitz-
Inn Auto Parks, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 853 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975).
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B. Alternate Theories
1. Bailment as an Implied Contract
Applying solely contract law to a parking structure situa-
tion, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Scruggs v. Dennis,39
held that an implied contract was created when the owner
parked his car in a downtown automated parking lot.40 The
court found a breach of the contract to redeliver and therefore
held the garage owner liable. "[To embrace the theory of the
respondent garage in this case [i.e., that no contract existed]
would be tantamount to nothing more or less than condona-
tion of a reduction of [a] storage operation for hire to a sub-
terfuge."4'
Sparrow v. Airport Parking Co.42 dealt with the loss of a
parked vehicle from the public parking lot at Philadelphia In-
ternational Airport. After reviewing bailment rules, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the lot operator had
not obtained sufficient control to create a bailment. How-
ever, the court went on to determine that an implied contract
in which the lot operator undertook a contractual duty of due
care might nevertheless exist. The case was remanded to de-
termine if, in fact, an implied contract was created and if so,
41
whether it included some undertaking to act with due care.
2. Special Duty of Care
In Equity Mutual Insurance Co. v. Affiliated Parking,
Inc.,"' the plaintiff submitted the contract between the park-
ing structure operator and the City of St. Louis, which owned
the structure. The contract specified how the operator was to
manage the facility, including duties to inventory overnight
parkers, call the police, etc. As is typical, the structure was
fully enclosed and the only way to exit was past tollbooths.
The court disposed of the contract-based arguments, primar-
39. Scruggs v. Dennis, 440 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. 1969).
40. See id. at 22. The remainder of the opinion dealt with the potential de-
fenses of a bailee who misdelivers a bailed item, holding, in essence, that there
are none. See id. See also Dispeker v. New Southern Hotel Co., 373 S.W.2d
904, 909 (Tenn. 1963).
41. Scruggs, 440 S.W.2d at 23.
42. Sparrow, 289 A.2d at 87.
43. See id.
44. Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Affiliated Parking, Inc., 448 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1969).
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ily on the ground that the vehicle operator was not a party to
the contract.5 Coming to the bailment contentions, the court
stated that a bailment is a contract created when an item's
owner delivers the item to another party on condition that it
be restored or delivered as instructed-the common defini-
tion.46 To be sufficient to create a bailment, the court held,
the delivery must be such as to enable the bailee to exclude
all others, including the owner, from possession for the bail-
ment period.47 The court found that the only factor indicating
any potential for control by the lot operator was the parking
ticket, which the court found was only used for determining
the fee, rather than controlling possession of the vehicle.
Based on that conclusion, the court held that no bailment
was created. 8
Having found no contract or bailment, the court in Eq-
uity Mutual next considered the proper characterization of
the relationship between the vehicle owner and the lot opera-
tor, i.e., whether the relationship was lessor-lessee or licen-
sor-licensee. Based on the uncertain period of use, the court
determined that a licensor-licensee relationship existed.49
The court then held that the lot operator, only in this special
situation, had a duty to use reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances to protect parked vehicles." Thus, the court held
that the structure operator had a tort-like duty with respect
to the parked vehicle. This duty was similar to a bailee's
duty.
In Equity Mutual, the Missouri court took the position
that the question of whether a parking structure situation
45. See id. at 910-13.
46. See id. at 914. This fairly common definition overlooks the property-law
genesis of bailment, which can create difficulty when only the vehicle's content
is damaged or stolen.
47. See id. at 914.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 915. The court noted that a lessor-lessee relationship requires
the conveyance of some interest in real estate for a fixed or definite period.
50. See Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Affiliated Parking, Inc., 448 S.W.2d 909,
915-16. The court held: "[I]n parking lot cases regardless of the character of the
legal relationship between the parties, there is a duty of ordinary care owed by
the operator of the premises toward the automobile left thereon." Id. at 915.
The court was very careful to distinguish cases involving personal injuries in
non-parking lot cases resulting from the condition of the licensor's premises or
acts of other individuals, where the court said the "old" rules concerning invit-
ees still applies. The court's reasoning at this point seems based solely on the
nature of the injury suffered, rather than any substantial legal theory.
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involves a bailment, lease, or license is essentially academic
because in each situation the "better" modern rule requires
the exercise of ordinary care toward the vehicle left on the
premises.5' However, the court did not fully equate parking
lot situations with bailments because it concluded that the
plaintiff had not proven how the lot operator breached its
duty.5 If the Missouri court had adopted its "better modern
rule" with bailments, it would have required the lot operator
to prove lack of negligence.
McGlynn v. Parking Authority of Newark5 involved a
downtown parking structure. After reviewing contemporary
parking lot cases, and particularly noting the lack of judicial
agreement when applying bailment rules, the New Jersey
Supreme Court decided it would be more useful to ignore the
rigid elements of bailment and instead to define the lot op-
erators' duty of care to patrons.54 Apparently this duty-of-
care determination is based on tort considerations. The court
noted that prior decisions had imposed a duty of care on
landlords to take reasonable measures to protect tenants
from foreseeable criminal conduct.55 The court then stated:
Ultimately, however, the imposition of a duty depends on
policy considerations such as the effect of the imposition of
the risks and burdens of an activity. In comparison with a
parker, the garage owner is better situated to protect a
parked car and to distribute the costs of protection
through parking fees. Furthermore, at an enclosed ga-
rage, car owners expect to receive back their cars in the
same condition in which they left them. The imposition of
a duty to protect parked vehicles and their contents is con-
sistent with this expectation. Thus, we hold that the op-
erator of an enclosed garage is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect the parked cars and those items
one would expect reasonably to find within them.56
51. See id. at 915. The court was very careful to place parking lots in a
category separate from other licensor-licensee situations, particularly those
where the licensee is injured on the premises.
52. See id. at 916.
53. McGlynn v. Parking Auth. of Newark, 432 A.2d 99 (N.J. 1981).
54. See id. at 104.
55. See id. (citing Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980)).
56. Id. (citations omitted).
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3. Sui Generis
New York's Appellate Division has apparently aban-
doned traditional analysis altogether, creating a sui generis
rule for airport parking structures (or perhaps for all park-
and-lock lots). Ellish v. Airport Parking Co. of America, Inc.57
(a three-two decision) involved a parking structure at JFK
International Airport. The Appellate Division first charac-
terized bailment as "merely a special kind of [implied] con-
tract" intended to approximate the parties' expectations.58
Therefore, the court said, traditional bailment rules were not
helpful (apparently concluding that bailment rules did not
approximate airport parkers' expectations). The Appellate
Division then stated that the rule for determining the lot op-
erator's liability should be based on "the realities of the
transaction in which the parties engaged."59 Because of the
significant public interest in temporary parking for vehicles
and the major importance of air transportation, the court
said, a fair and easy-to-apply rule should be formulated. The
court listed the factors on which its conclusions were based:
(1) The service provided.., was a space for [plaintiffs]
automobile to stand while she was away on her trip....
The plaintiff was not treated differently from other auto-
mobile operators; nor was she led to believe that the lot
would not be open to others.
(2) The service provided was.., impersonal....
(3) The plaintiff retained as much control as possible
over the automobile .... She did not expect or desire the
defendant to move the automobile in her absence.
(4) The plaintiff followed the directions contained in the
ticket she received [by locking her automobile].
(5) We can draw a reasonable inference . . . [that the
plaintiff] read the other warnings which [the ticket] con-
tained that the lot was not attended and that the parking
of her car was at her own risk. Thus, any expectation that
57. Ellish v. Airport Parking Co. of Am., Inc., 345 N.Y.S.2d 650 (App. Div.
1973).
58. Id. at 653. This characterization of bailment ignores bailment's prop-
erty-law foundation, substituting implied contract. The court's displaced
starting point substantially facilitated the court's creation of a new standard
and disregard of the long-standing policies supporting bailment rules.
59. Id.
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the defendant would take any special precautions to pro-
tect her car . . . could not reasonably have been in her
mind.60
(6) The actual operation of an airport parking lot must
have been apparent to her .... The plaintiff, seeing the
confusion and bustle, should have realized the gigantic
task which an individual check-out of each automobile
would require-a task which she was aware the defendant
did not undertake, since the ticket which she received did
not identify her automobile. 1
While it started by saying that the pivotal question was
between bailment and license, the court's conclusion did not
make that choice:
We are of the opinion that liability should not be deter-
mined by ancient labels and characteristics not connected
with present-day practices. It is one thing for the owner of
a livery stable to have to explain the disappearance of a
horse from its stall to the owner, but it is not at all the
same for the operator of a parking lot at a busy airport to
have to explain the disappearance from the lot of one of
the thousands of cars parked there daily. Unless proof of
negligence is present on the part of the operator of the lot,
the risk of loss must be assumed by the owner of the
automobile.62
The court's decision is not inconsistent with prior cases
that found no bailment was created. However, instead of re-
lying on established law, the court decided to create a new
rule, which seems to be a combination of contract and negli-
60. The dissent specifically challenges these assumptions, on the reasonable
grounds that modern drivers know what to do at a parking structure without
reading each structure's ticket. See id. at 656 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). While
the majority said the plaintiff was not bound by the exculpatory terms of the
ticket, it in effect enforced those terms.
61. Id. at 653-54. The court distinguished a case arising during the 1939
World's Fair, which found a bailment existed solely on the basis that a lot em-
ployee issued the entry ticket and directed the motorist where to park. Per-
haps if the JFK ticket-dispensing machine had a recording (or sign) saying:
"Park where you find an empty space," a bailment would have been created.
62. Id. at 655. In Linares v. Edison Parking, Inc., 414 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1979), the court cited Ellish for the proposition that a parking lot
operator is liable for negligence. The court found the lot operator negligent be-
cause "the removal of the tires, in the manner it was accomplished, created suf-
ficient noise to put the defendant's cashier on notice of an occurrence requiring
some action on his part." Id. at 661.
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gence, apparently only for parking lots. 3 Exactly what the
"fair rule, easy to apply" is, was not made obvious-unless
the rule is simply that the vehicle owner assumes all risk of
loss.
The Ellish dissent disagreed with the result, but appar-
ently not with the decision to fashion a new rule. The dissent
emphasized the captive-customer nature of the situation.
The public, according to the dissent, has a "right" to drive to
the airport but, after arrival, has no choice in where to park.'
The dissent also challenged the six factors upon which the
majority relied (quoted above). Instead of focusing on the ap-
parent impersonality of the situation, the dissent focused on
the factors that would be understood by a vehicle owner as
preventing her or him from freely using her or his vehicle as
desired. Particularly, the dissent emphasized the lot opera-
tor's obvious efforts to secure the premises against uncon-
trolled egress:65
Would not the patron have reason to believe, from the fact
that the lot was fenced in and its exit gate manned
throughout the day and night, that his car was safer there
than on the streets or in an unmanned, un-patrolled and
unfenced lot and that the lot operator was accepting su-
pervision and control, though limited in degree, of his
car?66
In the end, the distinction between the majority and dis-
sent in Ellish is based more on subjective conclusions about
63. In all the discussion, the Appellate Division never refers to any trial or
empirical evidence concerning the "expectations" of the average person using a
park-and-lock structure. Apparently the conclusions concerning those expecta-
tions were nothing more than the court's idea about what a person "should" ex-
pect.
64. See Ellish, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 665-68 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
65. See id. In Sealey v. Meyers Parking Sys., 555 N.Y.S.2d 574 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1990), the court's decision sounds like it is relying on Ellish but comes
to a distinctly contrary result. In Sealey, the automated four-story park-and-
lock garage was enclosed and employed a security guard. (The similar struc-
ture in Ellish was patrolled by airport police). A parker could leave only
through the cashier-attended exit. On those facts the court held that a bail-
ment existed. There is, rather obviously, no significant factual distinction be-
tween Sealey and Ellish, with the possible exception that the Sealey parking
garage was not at JFK airport. The court in Sealey appears to have found it
incredible that the security guard did not hear the vandals working on the
plaintiffs car. Perhaps a finding of negligence would have been both more ap-
propriate and consistent with Ellish.
66. Ellish, 345 NY.S.2d at 656 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
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patrons' "reasonable expectations" about security than on any
substantive legal theory.
The Ellish formulation (if it can be called that) can be
criticized as providing a parking lot operator with an oppor-
tunity not available to other commercial landowners. Based
on either the majority's or dissent's discussion, it is possible
to conclude that when a customer can observe conditions at
the lot which make it appear that the lot operator is making
little or no effort to deter theft and vandalism, the operator
has no duty of any kind to the lot patron. Such a rule en-
courages lot operators to be obviously, openly, and actually
unconcerned about the safety of vehicles and or persons in
them. It would be difficult to find a better way to encourage
auto theft.
At least one lower New York court used Ellish's general
theory but reached the opposite result in a substantially
identical case. In Greenberg v. Kinney Systems,67 the New
York City Civil Court, Small Claims, noted that Ellish recog-
nized that liability could be based on negligence. The court
found the lot operator liable for damages to the vehicle and
loss of its content because the operator failed to exercise even
a minimal degree of care. There was no evidence that the lot
operator patrolled the lot to protect its vehicles.68 The court
rather candidly noted:
To permit an operator of a public facility not to exercise a
minimal degree of care to assure the public that the facili-
ties are indeed suitable and reasonably safe for the pur-
poses for which it is intended, is to rent someone a space
in "hell." To rule otherwise would be against public pol-
icy.
69
Further variety in New York State case law comes from
67. Greenberg v. Kinney Systems, 534 N.Y.S.2d 85 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1988).
68. See id. at 86.
69. Id. (citations omitted). The Small Claims Court distinguished Ellish on
the basis that in Ellish there was evidence that the lot operator did undertake
some measures to protect the parked cars, where there was no similar evidence
in the case before it. Given the theory and language in Ellish, that distinction
is extremely weak. See id.
In Sealey, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 574, another Queens County Small Claims deci-
sion, the court purported to rely on Ellish but found that the lot operator had
undertaken security measures, thus implying that parked vehicles were pro-
tected. The facts used to "distinguish" Ellish were not substantially different
from the Ellish facts. The court rather obviously favored the Ellish dissent.
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a Buffalo court--"Upstate" New York may be a world apart
from "the City." In Garlock v. Multiple Parking Services,
Inc. ,70 Judge McCarthy's opinion includes an extensive review
of New York parking lot cases. The conclusion is not par-
ticularly flattering. With respect to Ellish, the decision
notes, perhaps with tongue in cheek:
Ellish is an interesting case, since it inherently, though
perhaps unconsciously, contains the emerging modern
theory for determining liability in parking lot cases. First,
bailment will be the legal key to liability; second, the
amount of security will determine whether there is a
bailment; third, the easier the operator makes it for the
auto to be stolen or vandalized, the less likely he is going
to be held liable.71
After further pointed, and reasonable, remarks about the
"emerging theory," Garlock concludes that the public policy of
the City of Buffalo, revealed in its licensing ordinance, is that
parking lot owners should be responsible for the safety of the
parked vehicles.72 While the court verbally applies a negli-
gence rule, rather than bailment, it places the burden of pro-
ducing evidence concerning the event on the parking lot
owner. Without that evidence, the lot owner is liable for
failing to provide reasonable protection under the circum-
stances.73 That looks quite like bailment under a different
name. Obviously lower New York courts have engaged in
some rather neat intellectual games to avoid the Ellish re-
sult.
While Queens and Buffalo may be a milieu different from
JFK International, perhaps Kentucky is in JFK country. In
Central Parking System v. Miller,74 the Kentucky Supreme
Court distinguished the "modern" automated parking struc-
ture with hundreds of cars per day from the "parking garage
of 1925." That distinction, the court found, made the "stan-
dards that were applicable to a liveryman" no longer practi-
cal.75  The Kentucky court expressly relied on Ellish and
70. Garlock v. Multiple Parking Servs., Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Buffalo City
Ct. 1980).
71. Id. at 675. One might question the first factor, but the remainder are
sound.
72. See id. at 677.
73. See id. at 678; see also discussion infra Part II.D.
74. Central Parking Sys. v. Miller, 586 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. 1979).
75. Id. at 262. The court expressly held that Blackburn v. Depoyster, 272
1999]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
found the lot operator not liable because the plaintiff pre-
sented no evidence of negligence. The plaintiff obviously re-
lied on the presumption of negligence in bailment rules. The
dissent in Central Parking contends that the modern vehicle
owner needs more protection than did the 1925 owner be-
cause of the large numbers of vehicles and the limited num-
ber of public parking spaces."6 The dissent could have, but
did not, mention the significantly higher rates of auto theft
and the modern illegal market for stolen cars and their parts.
In most parking structure cases, the courts have focused
on conclusions about the parties' hypothetical expectations
under the circumstances,77 not on any consistent legal theory.
Obviously, when the rules of bailment are abandoned, there
is no consensus concerning what rules should replace them.
C. Variations on a Theme-the Burden of Coming Forward
Under any of the legal theories discussed above, the ve-
hicle owner has the burden of proving the lot operator's li-
ability. When bailment rules are used, to prove a prima facie
case the plaintiff-bailor need only show that the bailed item
was not returned, or was returned in damaged condition."
S.W. 398 (Ky. 1925), which expressly refers to livery cases, "is no longer appli-
cable." Miller, 586 S.W.2d at 263.
76. See Miller, 586 S.W.2d at 263 (Sternberg, J., dissenting).
77. Since the courts do not mention any evidence introduced to prove the
parties' actual expectations, one must conclude that the relevant facts are so
generally known that it was deemed appropriate to take judicial notice of them,
and that reasonable persons would have the same expectations as the judges.
Such a conclusion is, however, inconsistent with the diversity of opinion (within
and between courts) concerning what those expectations are.
78. See, e.g., Malone v. Santora, 64 A.2d 51 (Conn. 1949); Davidson v. Ram-
sey, 210 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); Weinberg v. Waco Petroleum Co., 402
S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Pavesi v. Carollo, 481 N.Y.S.2d 756 (App. Div.
1984); J.W. Mays, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 221 N.Y.S.2d 766 (App. Div. 1961); Ste-
phens v. Katz Parking Sys., Inc., 348 N.Y.S.2d 492 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973);
Scruggs v. Dennis, 440 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. 1969); Allright, Inc. v. O'Neal, 596
S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980, no writ). Based on the normal rule that a
party can rely on third parties to not engage in unlawful or negligent behavior,
if the bailee proves the vehicle was stolen, the general result is that he/she/it
has met the burden of coming forward with exonerating evidence. That may
not preclude liability, however, because the plaintiff might be able to show that
the bailee-lot operator was aware of the potential for illegal activity, such as the
number of cars stolen or vandalized in this particular lot or others in the area
(from police records), or the actual security precautions taken by the lot opera-
tor. The finder of fact may well conclude that the lot operator contributed to
the loss by failing to take reasonable precautions under the circumstances. See
Pavesi, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 756; Motors Ins. Corp. v. American Garages, Inc., 414
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To avert liability, the bailee must then come forward with
evidence that the loss or damage was not due to his/her/its
fault.79 If the bailee can prove the exact cause of the loss,
then exercise of due care is an issue of fact, subject to the
normal burden of proof rules.8"
In contrast, under either regular negligence or licensee-
licensor rules, the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie
case merely by proving the item was damaged or lost while
on the defendant's property. Instead, the plaintiff must pres-
ent evidence showing the exact cause of the loss or damage."1
It takes little imagination to see why this distinction is
important in the average parking lot case. Regardless of the
type of parking lot, the vehicle owner is not present at or
near the time the relevant event occurs-the whole idea of
parking is leaving the vehicle while the owner is busy else-
where. Therefore, all the owner knows is that the vehicle
was missing or damaged when she or he returned for it.
Similarly, in most parking lots (especially large, multi-floor
structures) none of the lot operator's employees witness (or
remember witnessing) the relevant event. Thus, the only
evidence is that the vehicle was parked in good condition and
returned in damaged condition, or not at all. The direct
cause of the loss remains unknown. The choice between
bailment and negligence effectively determines liability.
When the exact cause of the loss is not proven: (1) under
bailment rules, the lot operator would be held liable due to
the presumption; or (2) under standard negligence/license
rules, the lot operator would not be held liable.
However, some courts that have decided to apply a "neg-
ligence" standard in parking structure cases have also
N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1979). But see Coleman v. Chicago Thoroughbred En-
ters., Inc., 243 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (effectively holding as a matter of
law that a parking lot operator has no duty to protect licensee's vehicles against
unlawful acts of third parties, despite evidence that some security measures
were taken).
79. See, e.g., Malone, 64 A.2d at 51; Davidson, 210 S.E.2d at 245; Weinberg,
402 S.W.2d at 597; Pavesi, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 756; J.W. Mays, 221 N.Y.S.2d at
766; Stephens, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 492; Scruggs, 440 S.W.2d at 20; O'Neal, 596
S.W.2d at 208.
80. See, e.g., Malone, 64 A.2d at 51; Davidson, 210 S.E.2d at 245; Weinberg,
402 S.W.2d at 597; Pavesi, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 756; J.W. Mays, 221 N.Y.S.2d at
766; Stephens, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 492; Scruggs, 440 S.W.2d at 20; O'Neal, 596
S.W.2d at 208.
81. See, e.g., Coleman, 243 N.E.2d at 333.
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adopted the presumption used in bailment. In McGlynn v.
Parking Authority of Newark," after holding that lot opera-
tors have a negligence-based duty of care to patrons, the
court addressed the proof problems:
The same policy considerations that support the presump-
tion of negligence with a bailment also support a presump-
tion of negligence in the enclosed garage context. Those
policy considerations are: (1) the operator is under a duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect the parker's prop-
erty; (2) the operator controls access to the premises; and
(3) the parker is absent while the car is parked. We con-
clude that a presumption of negligence arises from dam-
813age to a car parked in an enclosed garage.
The D.C. Court of Appeals, in Parking Management, Inc.
v. Gilder," implicitly applied a presumption of negligence be-
cause it sustained a judgment for the vehicle owner when
there was no evidence of the exact cause of loss.
III. CONTENTS OF VEHICLE
A. Introduction-Bailment Rules Generally Apply
The common starting point in cases concerning the al-
leged bailment of a vehicle's contents is the vehicle's bail-
ment, as discussed above. If the vehicle is not bailed (or the
lot operator has no duty with respect to the vehicle), the
standard conclusion is that there is no bailment of, or duty
with respect to, the vehicle's contents. 85 It may be theoreti-
cally possible to bail a vehicle's content without bailing the
vehicle. In practice, it is very difficult to imagine how that
might happen. The possessory aspect of bailment requires
transferring control to the bailee. If a person does not control
the vehicle, it would be very difficult for that person to con-
82. McGlynn v. Parking Auth. of Newark, 432 A.2d 99 (N.J. 1981).
83. Id. at 105. Interestingly (and unexplainably) the court cites Ellish in
support of this ruling.
84. Parking Management, Inc. v. Gilder, 343 A.2d 51 (D.C. 1975). See also
Garlock v. Multiple Parking Servs., Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Buffalo City Ct.
1980).
85. See, e.g., Allright Phoenix Parking, Inc. v. Shabala, 429 P.2d 513 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1967); Drybrough v. Veech, 238 S.W.2d 996 (Ky. 1951); Weinberg, 402
S.W.2d at 600 ("Of course, if Wayco was not a bailee of the plaintiff's automo-
bile, it was not a bailee of the contents.").
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trol the items in it. 86
Intuitively, one might expect contents to be automati-
cally bailed whenever the vehicle is bailed, i.e., that a vehi-
cle's bailment includes all things in the vehicle. Unfortu-
nately for the vehicle bailor, this intuitive conclusion is
contrary to many, if not most, court decisions. This seem-
ingly inconsistent result does not flow from some obscure ex-
ception in bailment law, but rather from a relatively me-
chanical application of traditional bailment rules.
As discussed earlier, a bailment does not exist without
the bailee's acceptance of the bailed item. 7 In the parking lot
situation, the obvious and principal item bailed is the vehi-
cle-few people separately take household goods or briefcases
to a parking lot for storage. However, if items in a bailed ve-
hicle are not automatically included in the vehicle's bailment,
then an independent acceptance is required. Courts applying
the most formalistic bailment rules require proof of a sepa-
rate and special bailment agreement covering any item in the
vehicle that is not an integral part of the vehicle.88 Even
courts that apply a less rigid formula conclude that the vehi-
cle's bailment includes the vehicle's content only if the facts
"show notice or knowledge of the alleged bailee that the goods
are in fact in his possession." 9 Even courts that expressly
86. See, e.g., Giles v. Meyers, 107 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio C.P. 1952).
87. See 8A AM. JUR. 2D, Bailments §§ 1, 28 (1997). There are, however,
situations in which a person may become an involuntary bailee, i.e., where a
person in possession of another's property may be required to protect that
property for the other's benefit. See id. § 39. One example is when the owner
accidentally misplaces property, e.g., leaves a briefcase in a restaurant chair.
88. See, e.g., Drybrough, 238 S.W.2d at 996; Barnett v. Latonia Jockey Club,
60 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1933); J.W. Mays, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 221 N.Y.S.2d 766
(App. Div. 1961); Palotto v. Hanna Parking Garage Co., 68 N.E.2d 170 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1946) (paying for vehicle's bailment, where lot operator had express notice
of contents, makes garage owner liable as bailee for hire); AMPCO Auto Parks,
Inc. v. Williams, 517 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974, writ refd n.r.e.); Bar-
nette v. Casey, 19 S.E.2d 621 (W. Va. 1942).
89. Greenberg v. Shoppers' Garage, 105 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Mass. 1952)
(quoting D.A. Shulte, Inc. v. North Terminal Garage, 197 N.E. 16, 19 (Mass.
1935)). In Greenberg, the court held there was a content bailment because the
vehicle owner expressly inquired about the safety of the valuable merchandise
in the vehicle (55 fur coats) if the vehicle was parked overnight, and had re-
ceived assurances of safety if the vehicle was locked. Greenberg, 105 N.E.2d at
840. In GMAC v. Grafinger, 306 N.Y.S.2d 606 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969), the court
held that there was no content bailment when the vehicle owner only said there
were "valuables" in the parked vehicle because, the court said, that description
gave no notice of the nature of the items. See also Barnett, 60 S.W.2d at 622;
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reject bailment as an "outmoded" concept in the parking lot
setting distinguish between duties with respect to vehicles
and duties with respect to vehicles' content.9 °
For the most part, vehicle-content issues are not treated
differently from other situations in which the item expressly
bailed contains, or may contain, other items, the exact nature
of which may not be known by the bailee. The fact that there
is no express, separate bailment of an item's contents does
not automatically exclude the contents from the bailment.
The more frequently applied rule is that if a person in the
bailee's position could reasonably foresee that a bailed item
may contain other items, those items are included in the
bailment.91
If the lot operator is made expressly aware of a vehicle's
content, a separate bailment agreement may result. How-
ever, in the cases that address such a situation, it appears
that the lot operator's information came more in the nature
of notice about the vehicle's content rather than in the nego-
tiation of an additional agreement.92 In some cases, the
parking operator denied liability, contending that the person
informed of the content was not authorized to enter into
bailment agreements for anything other than automobiles.93
Almost invariably, that contention avails the operator little.
Parking lot managers, and even mere attendants, have been
Campbell v. Portsmouth Hotel Co., 20 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1941); Greenberg v. Kin-
ney Sys., 534 N.Y.S.2d 85 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988); Weisman v. Holley Hotel Co., 37
S.E.2d 94 (W. Va. 1946).
90. In McGlynn v. Parking Auth. of Newark, 432 A.2d 99, 104 (N.J. 1981),
the court held: "[T]he operator of an enclosed garage is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect the parked cars and those items one would expect
reasonably to find within them." See also Hallman v. Federal Parking Servs.,
134 A.2d 382 (D.C. 1957); R.J. White v. Atlanta Parking Serv. Co., 228 S.E.2d
156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
91. See Robin v. Colaizzi, 166 N.Y.S. 978 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (woman's purse in
the pocket of a man's overcoat checked at a restaurant coatroom not included in
coat's bailment). See also White v. Atlanta Parking Serv. Co., 228 S.E.2d 156
(Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Davidson v. Ramsby, 210 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974);
Stephens v. Katz Parking Sys. Inc., 348 N.Y.S.2d 492 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973).
Cf. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Garages § 31 n.18 (1968).
92. See, e.g., Kole-Tober Shoes, Inc. v. Hoary, 491 P.2d 589 (Colo. Ct. App.
1971) (discussing a self-park facility where a driver specifically requested at-
tendant to lock the station wagon because it contained eleven sample cases all
within view of someone outside the vehicle).
93. See, e.g., Vallee v. Hyatt Corp., 433 So. 2d 1070 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (in-
dash CB-AM-FM radio considered part of the vehicle); U.S.F.&G. v. Allright
Shreveport, Inc., 256 So. 2d 479 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
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found to have implied or apparent authority to enter into
such secondary bailment agreements, even if expressly in-
formed that they could not accept anything but vehicles."
B. Items Generally Considered Part of a Vehicle's Bailment
In many, if not most, cases dealing with a vehicle's con-
tent, courts state a general rule and a decision, with little
analysis. A typical statement of the general rules applied to
a vehicle's content is:
Parking lot proprietors are liable for two categories of car
content: (1) the usual, ordinary equipment of a car, such as
articles in a trunk, which are reasonably anticipated to be
there; and (2) property which is in plain view .... These
questions, however, are for the trier of fact.
95
In one sense, there is no clear demarcation between the
motor vehicle and the "content" identified under the first
category in the preceding quote. Many cases deal with situa-
tions in which the vehicle is recovered, but in a damaged or
vandalized condition (i.e., "stripped"). The vehicle's engine is,
obviously, a major part of the vehicle; considerable effort is
required to detach a motor and without that, the bailed item
will not be a motor vehicle. There are other parts that are
more easily separated and have a separate intrinsic value
(such as tires96) that are considered part of the vehicle, if for
no reason other than a vehicle without tires is no more oper-
able than one without a motor, though the problem is more
easily remedied. Both tires and motors are essential parts of
the vehicle, necessary for operation. The vehicle's bailment
necessarily includes these items.
Other items frequently found in motor vehicles are not
objectively essential to its operation, such as hubcaps (or
"wheelcovers"), jacks, spare tires, and in-dash entertainment
94. But in H.S. Strygler & Co. v. Hill Estates, Inc., 322 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App.
Term. 1971), the court held that a night parking lot attendant did not have ap-
parent authority to accept bailment of $23,000 in jewelry which was in the ve-
hicle, despite prior holdings that apparent authority existed for things of lesser
value. The theory supporting that decision is rather obscure.
95. Allright, Inc. v. Guy, 696 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. App. 1985, no writ). In
Guy, the jury found for the plaintiff-vehicle owner for an amount substantially
in excess of the cost of repairs but the decision does not reveal the basis for that
excess. See id.
96. See, e.g., Linares v. Edison Parking Inc., 414 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1979).
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equipment. Objectively, these items are distinct from the ve-
hicle and have their own distinct function (as evidenced by
the fact they are frequently stolen from a vehicle without
theft of the vehicle itself). Despite that, these items are usu-
ally considered as being included in a vehicle's bailment, ei-
ther as "part of" the vehicle or as something reasonably ex-
pected to be found in a vehicle. 7 Most of the items that fall
within this category are things specifically designed to be
used in conjunction with a motor vehicle.98 Courts that deal
with the loss of these types of items generally hold that they
are so pervasive in vehicles (passenger automobiles) that it is
reasonable to foresee their existence in any automobile. 9
One court found that a portable cassette player, along with
cassette tapes, were reasonably foreseeable due to the com-
mon presence of audio equipment. °° It is fairly safe to pre-
dict that courts will reach a similar result for factory-
installed CD players, CD changers, and CDs as well. It is not
that these items are actually "part of the vehicle," but that
their presence is so pervasive as to make their presence fore-
seeable. Though the courts normally do not consider enter-
tainment equipment as an essential component of a vehicle,
the actual results reflect the general consumer attitude that
a car without an adequate stereo is incomplete.' Finding
97. See, e.g., McGlynn v. Parking Auth. of Newark, 432 A.2d 99 (N.J. 1981).
98. Audio equipment in motor vehicles operates on a different voltage than
home or portable audio equipment, and many are designed to fit the unique
contours of particular vehicles. Similarly, motor vehicle jacks can be used for
other purposes but are generally designed for automotive use; some, like audio
equipment, are designed to fit particular vehicles and are otherwise useless.
99. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Kinney Systems, 534 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (City Civ.
Ct. 1988) (holding radar detector and remote garage door opener to be "items
that were part of the car or items directly used in its operation" but no judg-
ment was granted for packages containing music albums and auto parts); Val-
lee v. Hyatt Corp., 433 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (La. Ct. App. 1983) ("[T]he radio was
an in-dash model and is best viewed as a component part of the automobile as a
whole."). In McGlynn, 432 A.2d at 104, the court treated a portable cassette
player on a cradle between the seats the same as it would treat a factory-
installed radio.
100. See, e.g., Vallee, 433 So. 2d at 1070; McGlynn, 432 A.2d at 99. Based on
the courts' reasoning in these cases, one might include a number of things in
this category, such as radar/laser detectors, garage door opener transmitters,
ice-scraping tools, tire chains (at least in colder climates during the winter), CB
radios, engine oil, windshieldwasher fluid, and maybe even a toolkit useful for
minor repairs.
101. The cases raise an interesting question concerning factory-installed "ac-
cessories." In many decisions, the fact that an item (e.g., a stereo radio) was
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this type of item part of a vehicle's bailment fits comfortably
within general bailment principles. It is not theoretically dif-
ferent from concluding that the bailment of an overcoat in-
cludes its buttons.
C. The Foreseeability Test
1. Express Notice and Items in Plain Sight
As almost everyone can testify from personal experience,
motor vehicles frequently contain items that are associated
with a vehicle's operation solely because they are being
transported in the vehicle-passengers, pets, pots and pans,
pizza, petunias, pachyderms, etc. At some point along a con-
tinuum between absolutely essential and totally unreason-
able, there is a dividing line between items that are auto-
matically included in a vehicle's bailment and those that are
not. In determining where to draw that line, courts generally
employ some type of foreseeability test. If a particular item's
presence does not fall on the foreseeable side of the line, the
vehicle owner must show something more than the item's
mere presence in the vehicle at the time of bailment.
The easiest cases of foreseeability involve express notice
of lot owners. Courts normally state that if the bailee is ex-
pressly made aware of items in the vehicle and accepts the
vehicle with that knowledge, the bailment includes the addi-
tional items regardless of their degree of association with the
vehicle."°2 However, there are few cases where such an ex-
press notice of the vehicle's content has been given.
Some courts have addressed situations in which it was at
least alleged that the items in the vehicle were "in plain
sight," such as lying on the front seat, back seat, or in the
rear of a station wagon. The results in those cases have been
inconsistent. In some cases, the in-plain-sight aspect was
factory-installed is cited as evidence of the item's intrinsic association with the
vehicle. Could these cases be used to argue that all factory installed or pro-
vided items are automatically included in the vehicle's bailment? With high
technology moving into automobiles (e.g., global satellite positioning computers,
trip recorders, driving guides, and maybe soon automatic pilot), it seems to
stretch the "reasonably foreseeable" envelope to include all factory-installed ac-
cessories, unless one takes into account the vehicle's make, model, and produc-
tion year. Should the "reasonable parking lot operator" be deemed aware of the
extent of factory-installed options available in all vehicles?
102. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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equated with actual notice.
In Swarth v. Barney's Clothes, Inc., 13 the plaintiff alleged
that she left her wallet on the front seat of the vehicle, which
would appear to satisfy the in-plain-sight rule. The court
held that the wallet was not included in the vehicle's bail-
ment, due to lack of express notice and the "fact" that "[s]elf-
evidently valuable and easily stolen articles are not left in
parked automobiles."' °4 Perhaps the court's thought was that
leaving a wallet full of money in a parked car is inherently
unforeseeable or incredible, even if in plain sight.
Based on the implied notice from things actually in sight
in the vehicle, it seems reasonable to conclude that those
items would be bailed with the vehicle.'0 5 However, an addi-
tional factor comes into play when the visible (or expressly
mentioned) items themselves contain items. Those cases
raise the same question as items that are not readily appar-
ent (such as in the trunk).
In Kole-Tober Shoes, Inc. v. Hoery,' the plaintiffs
salesman was driving a company station wagon that con-
tained eleven sample cases that could be easily seen from
outside the vehicle. The salesman specifically requested that
the lot attendant lock the vehicle because of the cases. The
lot operator argued that even if it was liable for the loss of
the cases, it should not be liable for the cases' contents. The
Colorado Court of Appeals rejected that argument because
the operator was aware that the items were sample cases.
Because the "defendants knew that some merchandise was in
the car, the fact that the specific type and value of the sam-
ples were not made known to them is of no importance." 7 In
other words, the awareness of the container carries with it
things that might be reasonably foreseen in that type of con-
tainer.
103. Swarth v. Barney's Clothes, Inc., 242 N.Y.S.2d 922 (App. Term 1963).
104. Id. at 923.
105. Cf. J.W. Mays, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 221 N.Y.S.2d 766 (App. Div. 1961).
106. Kole-Tober Shoes, Inc. v. Hoery, 491 P.2d 589 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
107. Id. at 591. The court cited Barnett v. Casey, 19 S.E.2d 621 (W. Va.
1942), to the effect that liability for the sample cases' contents would not extend
to items of extraordinary value not normally found in such cases. Id. See also
Greenberg v. Shoppers' Garage, Inc., 105 N.E.2d 839 (Mass. 1952) (55 fur coats
were visible through windows of plaintiffs station wagon and attendant was
told that vehicle contained valuable merchandise).
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2. Items Not in Plain Sight
With respect to unknown, not-in-plain-sight, items,
parking lot operators are in a position substantially similar
to a bailee of any item that may contain other items. The
question is whether the item actually inside the bailed item
was reasonably foreseeable by a person in the bailee's posi-
tion at the time of acceptance." 8 The answer to that question
in any particular case frequently depends on how the ques-
tion is posed, as anyone dealing with "foreseeability" ques-
tions knows. If the question is stated as: "Was it reasonably
foreseeable that the vehicle's trunk contained other items?"
the answer will almost universally be "yes." On the other
hand, if the question is stated as: "Was it reasonably foresee-
able that the vehicle parked at an airport parking lot had an
original Matisse painting in the trunk?" the answer will in-
variably be "no." In Campbell v. Portsmouth Hotel Co.,1°9 the
New Hampshire Supreme Court applied a relatively broad
foreseeability standard. The court held that travelers stop-
ping for the night at a hotel might reasonably be expected to
leave in their vehicle "accessories, equipment and baggage"
for which they had no need while at the hotel. Thus, the ho-
tel, as bailee of the guests' vehicle, was held to be the bailee
of the items inside the vehicle, even though no express notice
was given.
In addition to how the court poses the question, the an-
swer to the foreseeability question may also vary depending
on whether the question is considered one of fact or one of
law.
108. See, e.g., Davidson v. Ramsby, 210 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974)
(whether camera equipment, binoculars, briefcases, sporting equipment, tool-
box and tools could be reasonably expected to be in a car's trunk held to be a
jury question). In Davidson, the court sounds somewhat indignant about the
plaintiffs argument:
If the law is as contended by plaintiff [vehicle owner], and if the bailee
is responsible for all the contents of the car whether he had any knowl-
edge of such contents or not, suppose the car contained an expensive
diamond ring of the value of $100,000 (or $100,000 in currency for that
matter), must the bailee come up with $100,000 when the car is stolen?
What position is the bailee in to dispute the car owner's declaration
that the automobile did contain such an expensive ring, or $100,000 in
currency?
Id. at 248.
109. Campbell v. Portsmouth Hotel Co., 20 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1941).
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In Jack Boles Services, Inc. v. Stavely,"' the owner left
his luxury vehicle with the valet parking service at a private
golf course. In the vehicle's trunk was a valuable painting
entrusted by plaintiff Stavely to the vehicle owner's wife
some days earlier. The owner gave the vehicle's keys to the
valet attendant, who drove the vehicle to its parking place
and put the keys on the floor under the front seat (apparently
the standard practice)."' The vehicle was stolen; the thief did
not take the time to remove the painting from the trunk be-
fore driving off. Stavely alleged that Jack Boles negligently
allowed the painting to be stolen. The court's first analytic
step was to determine if Jack Boles owed any duty to
Stavely."' The court stated: "The existence of a duty is a
question of law for the court to determine from the facts sur-
rounding the incident in question. A duty of ordinary care
normally arises out of a bailor-bailee relationship." '13
In Stavely, there was no question that the vehicle itself
had been bailed. The court found that the painting was in
fact delivered to the parking attendant with the vehicle.
Therefore, the determinative question was whether the bailee
had accepted the painting. The court noted that under Texas
law, a bailee is liable for lost property of which it has actual
knowledge, and any property that it could reasonably expect
to be inside the expressly bailed item."' After reviewing
cases from Texas and other jurisdictions, the court held that:
[A] bailee accepts responsibility for unknown contents of a
bailed automobile when the presence of those contents is
reasonably foreseeable based on the factual circumstances
surrounding the bailment of the automobile .... The fore-
seeability of the value of the contained items does not bear
on the bailee's notice and acceptance of those items."
The court then decided, as a matter of law, that the sur-
rounding facts (i.e., parking an expensive vehicle at a Dallas
country club) could lead a reasonable person to believe that
the vehicle contained valuable things such as golf clubs, ten-
110. Jack Boles Servs., Inc. v. Stavely, 906 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App. 1995, writ
denied).
111. See id. at 187.
112. See id. at 188.
113. Id. (citation omitted).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 189 (citations omitted).
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nis rackets, and sportswear, but "[i]t cannot be said... that
a country club parking attendant should reasonably foresee
the presence of valuable artwork in each member's car
trunk.""6  Thus, in deciding the legal question of scope of
duty, the court applied a foreseeability test keyed to the type
of item. The court expressly declined to pose the foreseeabil-
ity question as: "Was it foreseeable that the vehicle might
contain valuable items?" In reaching that conclusion, the
court reviewed two prior cases concerning hotels.
In Berlow v. Sheraton Dallas Corp.,'17 a hotel failed to
redeliver a bailed package. When the hotel received the
package, it was unaware that the package contained valuable
jewelry. The hotel argued that the jury should have been in-
structed that the hotel was liable only if it could reasonably
foresee that the package contained valuable jewelry. The
court held that the jury question concerning foreseeability
could be framed in terms of whether valuable items might be
in the package, rather than the particular type of item."' In
other words, the jury was to determine if a reasonable hotel
could foresee that a bailed package contained valuable con-
tents; it was not limited to determining if the hotel could spe-
cifically foresee that the package contained expensive jew-
elry. When presented in that context, the answer seems to be
obvious: why would a hotel guest take a package with value-
less contents to the hotel management for safekeeping?" 9
In Shamrock Hilton Hotel v. Caranas,"° the hotel lost a
purse that had been bailed in its restaurant. The purse con-
116. Jack Boles Servs., Inc. v. Stavely, 906 S.W.2d 185, 190 (Tex. App. 1995,
writ denied). The question concerning foreseeability of valuable items, as op-
posed to the foreseeability of particular types of items, was raised by two prior
Texas cases dealing with hotel bailees.
117. Berlow v. Sheraton, 629 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App. 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
118. See id. at 822.
119. However, in Waters v. Beau Site, Co., 186 N.Y.S. 731 (N.Y. City Ct.
1920), the court held that the Hotel Biltmore had no reason to anticipate that a
patron's stored trunks contained a $1,000 diamond pendant. The court spent
considerable time distinguishing trunks and luggage being carried by a common
carrier and accompanying a traveler (can anticipate valuable jewelry) from the
trunks stored at a hotel for a former guest who anticipated returning in a few
days (cannot anticipate valuable jewelry). The distinction is not very convinc-
ing, particularly in light of the tour of the storage facility given to the plaintiff
before storing the trunks. The tour was obviously designed to assure the plain-
tiff of the absolute safety of stored items.
120. Shamrock Hilton Hotel v. Caranas, 488 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972, writ refd n.r.e.).
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tained jewelry worth over $13,000. The hotel contended that
it should be liable only for the "normal" contents of a purse,
such as petty cash and cosmetics. The court disagreed. The
court noted that the hotel was very well known and it was
general knowledge that guests often brought valuable jewelry
with them to the hotel. Thus, the court held, a jury could
reasonably find that it was foreseeable that a purse bailed at
that hotel's restaurant might contain jewelry and the hotel
was liable for failure to redeliver.
121
In the hotel cases, Texas courts found that both the item
and its contents were the subject of a single bailment. These
cases express the proposition that a bailee effectively accepts
the content of a bailed item so long as that content is rea-
sonably foreseeable under the circumstances, even if the
bailee is not in a position to determine the exact nature or
value of the content. It is not necessary that the particular
item's presence is foreseen, so long as it is within a category
of foreseeable items. Moreover, the hotel cases (and most
others) treat foreseeability as a factual question. Framing
the question for jury consideration remains a question of
law. 122
121. See id. at 155. Perhaps an average jury might conclude that everyone
who stayed at an expensive hotel and dined at its expensive restaurant would
necessarily have expensive items in their possession. Logically, a guest who
brought valuable jewelry to the hotel could: (a) place it in the hotel's safe, (b)
leave it in the hotel room, or (c) carry it wherever he or she went. Evidence
could no doubt be produced that alternative (a) was not used frequently, leaving
it foreseeable that the other alternatives were chosen. It is also likely that a
jury would find it reasonably foreseeable that a guest would not choose alterna-
tive (b), given the general knowledge that hotel employees have access to guest
rooms.
Without being sexist, one might surmise that the average male juror would
conclude that it is foreseeable that the average female's purse could contain
anything. The author firmly believes that women's purses somehow extend into
a fifth or higher dimension, allowing them to contain items that, individually or
collectively, substantially exceed four-dimensional limitations on mass and vol-
ume.
122. It appears that the hotel cases are contradictory with respect to the
proper jury question. Berlow, 629 S.W.2d at 818, keys the question to value,
rejecting the argument that the question should be keyed to the type of items.
See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. Caranas, 488 S.W.2d at 151,
keys the question to the type of item, rejecting the argument that it should be
keyed to "normal" (less valuable) items. See supra notes 120-21 and accompa-
nying text. This apparent inconsistency disappears when the type of container
involved is considered. In Berlow, the container was a nondescript box; other
than mass and volume, it gave no clue as to the character of its contents. Any
foreseeability test keyed to items must logically be answered either "anything"
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D. Applying the Foreseeability Test to Parking Lot Cases
There is at least one significant difference between the
hotel cases and the parking lot situation. In the hotel cases,
the sole function of items expressly bailed was to contain
other objects. Most motor vehicles' principal function is
transportation. Therefore, the probability that a vehicle con-
tains unrelated items is lower than with a purse or storage
box. This difference might explain the courts' difficulty in
dealing with items that are not directly related to a vehicle's
operation but are an object of the vehicle's function, i.e., the
items transported.
If the situation is treated as two bailments, one for the
vehicle and one for its contents, the bailor could theoretically
recover for loss of the contents even if he or she could not re-
cover for the vehicle. However, court decisions consistently
ask first if the vehicle was bailed, treating the potential con-
tent bailment as a subsidiary question. The most common
analysis is actually an extension of the analysis that supports
the inclusion of spare tires and jacks in the vehicle's bail-
ment, i.e., the item is found in vehicles so frequently that a
lot operator can foresee them in every vehicle.
In McGlynn v. Parking Authority of City of Newark,'23 the
New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
In a modem society, where car radios and cassette players
are common, it is reasonable to expect that a car will con-
tain a small cassette player and cassettes. Thus, in this
case the duty of the [lot operator] extended to the cassettes
and cassette player in the McGlynn vehicle as well as to
the hubcaps and outside antenna of the Backer vehicle.
124
In effect, the court concluded that a cassette player and cas-
settes are as common in cars as coins are in purses.
In Vallee v. Hyatt Corp.,'25 the primary issue was the
amount of damages to be awarded as a result of the plaintiffs
vehicle being stolen and then recovered in a damaged condi-
or "nothing." The purse in Caranas does, however, give some clue about its
content, making a foreseeability test keyed to type of content more appropriate.
Where motor vehicles may fall on a continuum between women's purses and
nondescript boxes could be the subject of considerable debate.
123. McGlynn v. Parking Auth. of Newark, 432 A.2d 99 (N.J. 1981).
124. Id. at 104. A similar conclusion was reached with respect to an in-dash
CB-AM-FM radio/cassette player, which was considered a component part of
the vehicle. Vallee v. Hyatt Corp., 433 So. 2d 1070 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
125. Vallee, 433 So. 2d at 1070.
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tion. When the vehicle was recovered, the in-dash CB-AM-
FM radio/cassette player and a number of miscellaneous
items were missing.'26 With respect to the radio, the court
noted that it was an in-dash model and best viewed as a
component part of the automobile.127 As for the other items,
the Louisiana Court of Appeals relied on the Louisiana Su-
preme Court's decision in Insurance Co. of North America v.
Solari Parking28 for the proposition that it would be unrea-
sonable to conclude that the lot operator was unaware that
people frequently leave personal items in their vehicle.'29
Therefore, the court held the defendant liable for those items,
including the ones not inherently part of the vehicle.
The "notice of contents" requirement for non-accessory
items places the vehicle owner in a dilemma. In AMPCO
Auto Parks, Inc. v. Williams,130 plaintiff Williams was visiting
Dallas, driving a rented car. He parked at AMPCO's com-
mercial lot, receiving a "stub" from an attendant. The vehi-
cle's locked trunk contained personal clothing, "silver dollars,
silver quarters, pictures, antique family heirlooms, jewelry,
and a pre-Columbian bell (1000 B.C.)."1 1  Due to apprehen-
sion about employee theft, Williams deliberately did not tell
the lot attendants about the trunk's content. Applying the
general rule concerning actual notice or reasonable foresee-
ability, the jury found that AMPCO, "acting as a reasonable
and prudent person" would not have foreseen that Williams'
vehicle's trunk might contain "valuable articles of clothing."'32
The Texas Appellate Court upheld the jury's verdict. The
court distinguished Caranas33 (the hotel purse case) stating
that the reasonableness question is one of fact and juries
126. The personal items included several eight-track tapes, a tire gauge,
miscellaneous tools, business papers, and a porcelain duck. See id. at 1073.
127. See id.
128. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Solari Parking, Inc., 370 So. 2d. 503 (La.
1979). See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. See also AMPCO Auto
Parks, Inc. v. Williams, 517 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
129. See Vallee, 433 So. 2d at 1072.
130. Williams, 517 S.W.2d at 401.
131. Id. at 402.
132. Id. at 402-03. The silver dollars, silver quarters, pre-Columbian bell,
etc. were apparently overlooked by the trial court in its instructions. Appar-
ently, this represented a sub silentio conclusion that those items were inher-
ently unforeseeable (or unreasonable or incredible). See id.
133. Shamrock Hilton Hotel v. Caranas, 488 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972, writ refd n.r.e.). See supra note 122.
[Vol. 40
PARKING LOT CASES
might reasonably conclude that valuable items are foresee-
able in a woman's purse but not in an automobile's trunk.
While there is variation in results in vehicle-content
cases, it is much less than in vehicle cases that do not relate
to content. The courts consistently enunciate a test keyed to
the foreseeability of items in the vehicle. The theory used to
determine if the lot operator had a duty toward the vehicle
has had little impact on vehicle-content results. Thus, even
though contents are theoretically a separate bailment, they
are treated as an add-on to the vehicle's bailment. In other
words, if the court finds the lot operator has some duty of
care with respect to the vehicle, the only additional question
is whether the vehicle's contents were foreseeable. If so, the
lot operator has the same duty with respect to those contents.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
On the whole, the news for the vehicle owner is bad,
principally due to the nuances of bailment and negligence
rules (combined, perhaps, with lack of choice). Applying
those nuances produces results that are inconsistent with the
degree of responsibility of commercial property owners in
general. Everyone has heard of a grocery store operator be-
ing held liable in "slip and fall" incidents where the injured
person could have avoided by minimal attention to what he
or she was doing. The common factor in those cases is that
no one knows exactly how the "foreign" substance came to be
on the floor (which is similar to the lack of information in
parking lot cases). Similarly, most people have heard of
apartment or hotel operators being held liable because they
failed to take actions to deter criminal activity."' Parking lot
operators use their real property to make money from other
people using the property-just as grocers and apartment
owners-so why should the legal responsibilities be substan-
tially different?
There is a logical explanation for the difference. In non-
parking lot situations, the landowner invites others to come
on the property to engage in particular activities (e.g., to buy
things, to watch a movie, to live, etc.). In contrast, the park-
134. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965). Section
302B speaks in terms of "harm to another" but comment b of that section clari-
fies that "harm to another" includes harm to property. In all the parking lot
cases reviewed, none referred to this section.
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ing lot operator invites others merely to leave their vehicles
on the property while the vehicle owners are busy elsewhere.
The principal threat in parking lots is property damage, not
personal injury. The law generally provides a greater degree
of protection from personal injury. Therefore, the social pres-
sure to impose liability on the property owner is less in the
parking lot situation.
Applying traditional bailment rules in parking lot cases
produces relatively predictable results. However, there is
some uncertainty when the case concerns a vehicle parked in
an automated park-and-lock structure. That uncertainty re-
sults from the requirement that, to create a bailment, the ve-
hicle owner must surrender significant control of the vehicle
to the lot operator. When the vehicle's keys are given to the
lot operator, the transfer of control is obvious. However,
when the lot operator's only control is through preventing
vehicles from leaving the structure, the result is less obvious.
In one sense, the lot operator's control is significant-what
good is a vehicle that can only be driven inside a single
parking structure? However, preventing exit is the only way
in which the lot operator exercises control. The vehicle owner
retains both control of access to the vehicle's interior and the
exclusive ability to move the vehicle under its own power.
Applying traditional bailment rules to this situation will
most likely result in a conclusion that no bailment is created
because the lot operator is not given control over individual
vehicles exclusive of the owner. Courts have not been satis-
fied with that result, more for policy reasons than difficulty
in applying bailment rules. As noted by a number of courts,
if no bailment exists, the lot operator has minimal, if any, re-
sponsibility to safeguard the vehicle. While vehicle owners
can take measures to deter theft or vandalism (alarms are
becoming standard equipment), the lot operator is in the best
position to spread the losses."5 Being liable for losses would
encourage the lot operator to take measures to deter theft or
vandalism, which he is in a much better position to do than
the vehicle owner.
136
135. Allocating losses to the vehicle owner also spreads the cost but in a less
precise manner, i.e., to all insured vehicles, not just those that frequent parking
structures. This is also less precise because the risks vary depending on the
structure, its location, and how it is operated.
136. One argument against finding a bailment is that machine-dispensed
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In deciding particular cases, the legal theory applied may
be less important than who has the burden of supplying the
evidence of the exact cause of the loss. In other words, who
loses if the only evidence is that the vehicle was missing
when the owner returned? Here, again, the lot operator is in
the best position to have the necessary evidence. By defini-
tion, the vehicle owner is not around to watch the vehicle.
The lot operator is in a position to employ both human and
electronic surveillance at all times.'37 Thus, placing on the lot
operator the burden of producing evidence of the exact cause
of loss is a necessary corollary to any conclusion that the lot
operator has a duty to vehicle owners. As in bailment, the
ultimate burden of proof would remain with the plaintiff."'
Fashioning rules concerning a vehicle's content is more
problematic. Most courts addressing this issue hold that the
only contents included in a vehicle's bailment are: (1) things
included in an express additional bailment ("notice"), and (2)
things a reasonable person would anticipate being in the ve-
hicle (the "reasonable anticipation rule").
In today's world, common sense counsels against advis-
ing lot operators or their employees that the vehicle contains
valuable personal property.'39 Giving out that information
would only lower the risk-return ratio for dishonest employ-
ees. Common sense (and law enforcement advice) also coun-
tickets are not associated with a particular vehicle. Modern technology could
fairly easily eliminate that objection. Video cameras could be positioned to take
a picture of the vehicle and its license plate (or operator, or both) when the
ticket is dispensed at the entry gate. The picture can be electronically keyed to
the ticket number and stored in computer memory. When the ticket is pre-
sented, the attendant would be shown a picture of the vehicle (and driver), al-
lowing verification. Most current automated systems permit persons without
vehicles to obtain tickets, putting the operator only in the position to know that
more tickets were issued than cars exited, assuming that it is tracked on a
regular basis, which is doubtful. Video cameras at various locations could also
increase security levels. Unfortunately, cases like Ellish, see supra notes 57-61
and accompanying text, actually encourage lot operators not to take steps to
guard patrons' vehicles.
137. The "exact cause of loss" in this setting requires more than merely tes-
timony tending to show the vehicle was stolen. Testimony that neither the lot
operator (if a person) or any employee stole the vehicle is, at best, self-serving.
Making that sufficient evidence of non-liability would more likely promote per-
jury than prevention.
138. A lot operator who can prove the exact cause of loss would probably, at
the same time, provide substantial evidence that reasonable precautions had
been taken.
139. There is probably a reasonable exception in salesman-sample situations.
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sels against leaving personal items in plain sight, which
many courts hold is sufficient notice of the visible content.'40
Thus, while the "notice" rule is perfectly acceptable, it will
rarely be applicable.
The reasonable anticipation rule is not, in itself, subject
to strenuous objection. On one hand, a lot operator should
not be liable for extremely valuable items (e.g., $100,000 in
cash or jewelry) left in a parked vehicle. On the other hand,
some courts' interpretation of a reasonableness rule effec-
tively eliminates the lot operator's duty of care. Given the
extreme variety of lot designs, locations, manners of opera-
tion, etc., perhaps the best course is to frame the issue as one
of fact: could a reasonable lot operator, in circumstances
similar to the particular evidence of the case, anticipate this
type of item being left in the vehicle? 4'
So where does all this leave the lot operator and the ve-
hicle owner? Certainly not in comfortable certainty with con-
sistent, easily applied rules. This state of affairs could be
improved by consistent application of traditional bailment
rules. They are relatively simple and easy to apply. The only
substantive improvement needed is to apply the Massachu-
setts rule 4 2 recognizing that the lot operator's ability to pre-
vent exit is sufficient control to establish a bailment. With
that interpretation, bailment rules would produce results
consistent with most persons' sense of "what is right."
140. If a negligence theory is applied to parking lot cases, a reasonable ar-
gument could be made that a vehicle owner was contributorily negligent when
he left things in plain sight or when he told lot attendants about valuable con-
tents (in sight or not).
141. Whether the fact issue should be framed in terms of value or in terms of
item type (addressed in Jack Bowles Servs., Inc. v. Stavely, supra notes 110-16)
might be avoided by using both the type of item and its value in framing the
issue statement or jury instruction. Very logical arguments can be made for
keying the issue to value. For most people, leaving a costume-jewelry tennis
bracelet in a vehicle trunk would not be unreasonable. Those same persons
would, however, find it unreasonable to leave in the same trunk a diamond
tennis bracelet worth $1,000. Therefore value is a factor. In addition, if one
might reasonably anticipate a vehicle containing $500 in computer programs,
the lot operator's obligation is not changed if the vehicle actually contains $500
worth of something else.
On the other hand, the type of item that may be reasonably anticipated can
have an impact, particularly on the degree of risk involved. Obviously, if a rea-
sonable lot operator can anticipate a vehicle containing a particular type of
item, so can a reasonable thief. Higher risks justify more vigorous security
measures, regardless of the individual value of the risk-producing items.
142. See supra note 38.
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